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Under the facts of the instant case, application of any rule 
of interpretation or statutory modification would result in a dec­
ision that the drawer cannot recover from the drawee the amount 
charged against the account of the drawer. Since the employee 
was the signing officer of the drawer, the Kentucky and Missouri 
rules are satisfied, as is the modified statute. And, since the act 
was committed within the apparent scope of the agent’s authority, 
the agency analysis, as set forth by Professor Britton and the 
California court, is satisfied. Indeed, even the anomalous jurisdic­
tions, such as Texas, would concur on these facts, since the acts 
of a corporation’s executive officers, though a fraud on it, are 
binding 011 the corporation, as to third parties, if done within the 
scope of their apparent authority.
Robert Keegan and Gordon Jackson 
S.M .U. Law.
Comment:
Although it would appear from the wording of the Bills of 
Exchange Act that only one problem need be resolved, that the 
payee be fictitious or non-existent, while the Negotiable Instru­
ments Law has the further requirement that such fact be the 
intention of the person making the instrument so payable, this 
apparent difference disappears upon an application of the two 
statutes to a particular set of facts. In Canada, in order to ascer­
tain whether a payee is fictitious, a determination must first be 
made of the intent of the party causing such person to be named 
as payee, for there is 110 other method to determine whether the 
payee was intended to have an interest in the instrument. I11 the 
United States, the existence of such intent is an express require­
ment of Section 9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It 
would appear that in both Canada and the United States upon 
proof of intention that the payee be fictitious, then the instru­
ment is payable to bearer.
C O N ST R U C T IO N  W O R K  — N E G L IG E N C E  — LIA BIL­
IT Y  O E C O N TR A C TO R S — D U T Y  O F C O N TR A C TO R  — 
PL A IN T IFF  A W A RE O F DANGER.
'The result of the recent House of Lords decision in A. C. 
Billings &  Sons Ltd. v. R iden1 is that contractors interfering with 
the acccss to a building must use reasonable care to ensure that 
persons lawfully2 entering will not be injured because of the inter­
ference. 'The appellant contractors while reconstructing the
1. [19571 3 All K .R .I; see the com m ents by R. K. M egairy, (1957) 73 l.aw
( ) .R c \ . 294 and 433 and T . L . M ontrose (1958) 21 M od. L . Rev. 7(>.
2. T h e  lespondent was lawfully 011 the prem ises; the question of trespass­
ers did not arise.
entrance to a house negligently left the front door inaccessible 
cxcept by crossing the forecourt of the adjoining house clcse 
to a sunken area, which route the contractors advised the occip- 
ants of the house to use. The respondent, a sevcntv-one year old 
lady, visited the occupiers, entering by the indicated route; as she 
was leaving, after dark, she fell into the sunken area and was 
injured. Her action was dismissed on the ground that she, know­
ing of the sunken area, was fully aware of the danger. Judgment 
was based on the principle that a licensee can never complain of 
dangers which arc obvious or known to him. An appeal was allow­
ed, By a majority, on the ground that the duties of occupiers and 
contractors doing work on land are not identical; contractors are 
under a general duty imposed bv law to use reasonable care not 
to injure other persons reasonably contemplated to be in the 
vicinity. This decision was unanimously affirmed by the House 
of Lords.
In so deciding the House of Lords appliedClayard v. Dethick 
and Davis3 and Mooney v. Lanarkshire County Council.4 Malone 
v. Laskey5 was expressly overruled so far as it dealt with negli­
gence. The rule laid down in the instant case is simply that con­
tractors carrying on operations on the premises of another have 
a duty to ensure that persons lawfully on the premises should 
not be exposed to danger by their actions; the extent of the duty 
is to use reasonable care, and ordinarily notice of danger will not 
suffice.
-Although the decision was unanimous, the speeches indicate 
some difference of opinion in the scope of duty, and contain con­
flicting dicta. Four judgments were given. Lord Reid, with whom 
Viscount Simonds concurred, said:
. . . .  I see no reason why the co n tracto r who chooses to 
prevent safe access by visitors should be entitled  to re l\ on 
any specialty in the law of licensor and licensee.
In mv opinion, the appellants were un der a du ty to all 
persons who m ight be exp ected  lawfully to visit the house, 
and that duty was the ord in ary  duty to take such care  as in all 
ih c circum stances of the case was reasonable to ensure that 
visitors were not exposed to dan ger by th eir actions.«
3. (1848) 12 Q .B . 43?); Ilf» F..R . 932 .
4. [19.r>4] S .L .T . 137.
5. [1907] 2 K .B. 141; th at case decided that excep t w here a co n tractu al
relationship exists, if a person carryin g  on op eration s on the prem ises
of an o th er negligently injuries a th ird  person, no cause of action  arises
because there is no breach of du ty on the p art of the person sought
to be m ade liable. This was expressly overruled  by V iscount Simonds,
L ord  R eid and Lord  Som m ervcll; L ord  Cohen and L o rd  K eith of Avon- 
holm  said the principle was wrong.
<*. f!9.r>7| 3 All K .R .l , at p. 5.
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Later he continued:
. in my opinion th eir duty to visitors required them  to 
m itigate  the result of th eir in terference in so far as in ail the  
circu m stan ces it was reasonable th at they should do so . . .  .
But even if I am w rong in th at I think that they were still at 
fault. T h ey  should h a \e  given w arning against the use of this 
route instead of advising its use.7
From the last sentence, it might be concluded that a warning 
would exculpate the contractors; however, his Lordship in another 
passage said the result of the Clayard case, and others, was that 
in such circumstances there is no magic in giving a warning.8
Lord Cohen agreed with what Denning, L. J., had said in the 
Court of Appeal:
. . . the claim  is one for breach of a duty of care. In  such a 
case I think the m easure of liability is correctly  stated by 
Denning, L . J . ,  w'here he says [1956] 3 All E .R . at p. 362: “T h e  
(appellants) are  liable, not because they created  a dangerous  
state of things and they are  un der a duty to use reasonable  
care  to prevent dan ger from  it . . . (T h ey  m ight in some 
circum stances fulfill th eir duty of care  to visitors by p u ttin g  
up a w arning in clear term s 'D anger. Keep o u t’; for th at m ight 
suffice to prevent dam age to them . T h e  occupants of the house  
m ight then have grounds of com plaint for blocking th eir  
access, but the visitors would not.) If, how ever, con tractors  
do provide an altern ative rou te , on or off No. 25,® o r  adopt an  
altern ative rou te , or point one ou t, as (the appellants) did 
here, or if it is an obvious deviation for a visitor to take, the  
con tracto rs are  un der a duty to use reasonable care  to  prevent 
dam age to  visitors who take th at route. A co n tracto r who  
creates a dangerous state of things cann ot escape th e conse­
quences by leading people into an o th er danger.*«
This passage clearly indicates the nature and scope of the duty 
in such a case; the obiter dictum as clearly indicates what, in the 
opinion of Lord Cohen, would be the scope if the injury occurred 
on adjoining premises.
Lord Keith of Avonholm expressly disagreed with the above 
passage from the judgment of Denning, L. J.11 l ie  said:
. . .  I agree th at the appellants had a duty to protect m em ­
bers of the public . . . from  harm  as a result of th eir o p e ra t­
ions. I he exten t of that duty m ight depend on what a reason­
able m an m ight contem p late as likely to happen on the  
prop erty  . . .  I em p h asi/e  the w ords ‘on th e p rop erty ’
7. Ib id , at p. 10.
8. Ib id , at p. 6.
9. T h e  property on which the work was being done.
10. [1057] 3 All F..R .1, at p. II.
11. Ib id , at p. 13; "So \iew in g  the m atter , I find myself unable to agree
w ith a passage in the judgm ent of D enning, L . J . ”
12. Ib id , at p. 12.
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11 is Lordship then expressly rejected the view that if injury 
occurrcd wholly 011 adjoining land the contractor would be liable 
for the following reason:
If a person encourages a nespass and an o th er person accepts  
the encou ragem en t, both being aw are of the position, and the 
actual trespasser is injured by some dan ger on the land tres­
passed on . known to both, th ere  is no prin ciple I know of 
which would attach  liability to the in stigator or encourage) 
in a question with the tresp asser.'::
It would appear that Lord Keith directed his mind to ioint-tres- 
passers, which, it is submitted, does not seem to be applicable to 
the present ease.
Commenting 011 the view expressed by Lord Keith, R. E. 
Mcgarry has suggested that whether injury occurrcd 011 or off the 
premises would he irrelevant as the relationship between the 
plaintiff and adjoining land owners could not affect the contrac­
tor’s own duty of care; the contractor’s liability would be based 
011 the ground that they created a situation which forced the 
plaintiff to take a risk. T o  use his words:
. . . the fact that the risk would entail a technical trespass 
on the land of a th ird  person did not m ake it unforseeable  
because a reasonable person, in the p lain tiff’s position, m ight 
assum e that a neighbour would not object to such a slight in ­
fringem ent.
Regardless of what a person might assume of adjoining land­
owners, it is submitted that the plaintiff’s relationship with an 
adjoining owner could have no effect 011 the contractor’s liabil­
ity if injury resulted from a breach of the contractor’s own duty 
of care.1B Lord Somervell of Harrow expressed this view when he 
said:
. . .  a person execu tin g  work on prem ises, as were the ap p ell­
ants in this case, is undei a general duly to  use reasonable  
care for the safety of those whom  he knows or ought reason­
ably to know m ay be affected by or lawfully in the vicinity of 
his work.
As was said above, the I louse of Lords in this case applied 
Clayard v. Dcthick and Davis 17 and rejected the principle of 
Malone v. Laskey.'* It is submitted that these cases could have
13. ¡h id , at p. 13; L ord  Keith found liability as the fall began on th e p ro ­
perly where the work was being done.
14. (I9.'>7) 73 Law Q. Rev. 4.33.
I “». If A is injured as a direct result of the negligence of B, th at A was at  
the tim e a trespasser on the land of is no defence to an action.
16. |li):»7l 5 All F ..R .I, at p. IS.
17. ( I848) 12 Q .B . 439; 116 F .R  932.
18. 11907] 2 K.ll. 141.
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been distinguished because there was a finding of nuisance in the 
Clayardscase, but in Malone v. Laskey there was no nuisance. In 
the instant case, as in Malone v. Laskey, there was no nuisance, 
no noxious thing, and no invitor-invitee relationship, one of which 
was necessary according to Malone v. Laskey to ground liability. 
To find the contractors liable, it was, therefore, necessary to over­
rule Malone v. Laskey. It is not surprising that the House of 
Lords found liability; for although Malone v. Laskey was followed 
in Ball v. London County C ouncil1!* and often referred to,-0 it 
was often criticized,-1 and in the recent case of Mooney v. Lan 
ark County Council'-- (applied in the instant case) the Scottish 
Court of Sessions expressly refused to follow Ball v. London 
County Council and found contractors liable on general principles 
of negligence.
It must be considered satisfactory that Malone v. Laskey has 
been finally overruled. There seems to be 110 valid reason why 
contractors should be immune from liability simply because they 
cannot be brought within a certain category. This view is by 110 
means novel. In Donaghue v. Stevenson Lord Atkin, speaking of 
Blacker v. Lake and Elliott-\ in which the rule in Malone v. 
Laskey was applied, said:
T h e  judgm ents in the case e rr  by seeking to confine the law 
to  rigid and exclusive categories, and by not giving sufficient 
atten tion  to the general p rn icip lc  which governs the whole 
law of negligence in the duty owed by those who will be 
im m ediately injured by lack of care .-^
Although the rule in Malone v. Laskey has been applied by 
Canadian courts25 and the instant case is not binding here, it is 
difficult to imagine why it should not be followed. Tne questoin
19. [1949] 2  K .B. l.'>9.
20. See B lacker v. Lake unit Elliott (1912) 106 L .T . ">33; W hite  i<. Steadm an  
(1913) 109 L .T . 2 49 ; C u n a rd  v. A n tify re  Ltd. [1933] I K .B. 551; Otto 
v. Holton and X o rris  [1930] I AU F..R. 900; M etropolitan P ro p erties  L td . 
i>. Jo n es  [1939] 2 All K.R. 202 ; David v. Foots (1940] 1 K .B. 110.
21. G o od h art, 65 Law  Q. Rev. 518; Salm ond on T o rts , l l th  Kcl., p. 602; 
C harlesw orth on N egligence, p. 190; and Clerk & Lindscll on T o rts , 10th 
Ed., p. 001 express the opinion th at M alone v. Laskey was wrongly 
decided on the issue of negligence. Street on T o rt at p. 181, says: 
“ . . . the weight of op inion and the conflict in Hall v. L o ndo n C ounty  
C o u n cil and H aseld in e  v. Dare leads to the conclusion that Ball i>. 
L o n d o n  C ounty C ou ncil was wrongly decided, a fo rtiori M alone  i». 
¡.askey m ust be w rong.”
22. [1954] S .L .T . 137.
23. [1912] 106 L .T . 533.
24. [1932] A.C. 562, at p. 594.
25 . (¡reason  v. H en d e iso n  H o lle r  H earing Co. (1910) 20  O .L .R . 584; Bilton
M ackenzie  (1914) 31 O .L .R . 585 ; D oiois  i' P u re  Sprint’ Co. [1935]
S .C .R . 319; H a m m o n d  v. Dai'idson  [1940] 2 D .I..R . 249.
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whether the duty of care would extend to injuries on adjoining 
land and to trespassers 011 the premises where the work was being 
done did not have to be answered, but it is submitted that, for the 
reasons adduced, there should be no difference in a contractor’s 
liability in such cases.
Daniel Hurlev
III Law, U.N.B.
W IF E ’S REFUSAL TO BAR DOW ER IN HUSBANDS 
CONTRACT OF SALE — PURCHASER INSISTING ON A 
CLEAR TITLE — PURCHASERS RIGHT TO ELECT  
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE — POW ER OF COURT TO 
ORDER PORTION OF PRICE PAID INTO COURT TO 
SECURE DOW ER — NO ABATEMENT OF PRICE TO 
PURCHASER.
The effect of a wife’s refusal to bar her dower in land that 
her husband has contractcd to sell has been reviewed recently in 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Freedman v. M ason} Here Louis 
Freedman signed an offer to purchase certain lands of Mason 
listed with real estate brokers. W hen the brokers presented the 
offer to Mason, he acceptcd and signed it, but his wife did not 
sign. Later on discussing the contract with his solicitors, Mason 
saw that it was not as advantageous as he had at first thought, and 
he decided not to carry it out. He was also informed that nis wife 
was not obliged to sign the deed and to bar her dower. Mason 
informed Freedman that unless a more satisfactory agreement 
could be reached, his wife would refuse to bar her dower. Negotia­
tions proved futile. Before the closing date of the transaction, 
Louis Freedman assigned the offer to purchase to the appellant, 
Svdnev Freeman. The appellant’s solicitors tendered the amount 
due under the contract. Mason’s solicitor tendered a deed signed 
bv Mason only and demanded the full purchase price. The appell­
ant refused to accept the deed or a return of the deposit, but de­
manded a deed with bar of dower executed.
The appellant brought an action for specific performance or 
damages. lie  later added an alternative claim praying for specific 
performance with an abatement of the purchase price for the in­
choate right of dower. At the trial a further alternative claim was 
added —  an order declaring that the appellant was entitled to a 
conveyance by Mason and to have a sum set aside from the pur­
chase price to provide for the wife’s claim to dower if she should 
survive her husx>and and that during the joint lives of Mason and 
his wife, the interest on the money so set aside should be paid to 
Mason. The Court held that the appellant wras entitled to the 
last alternative.
I. C1957) 9  n .L .R . (2d) 262.
